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EXTENDING THE LESSONS OF
HADLEY V. BAXENDALE 1
John Kidwellt
INTRODUCTION

I have taught the venerable case of Hadley v. Baxendale more than
thirty times to students in Contracts I and an additional thirty or more
times to students in a Remedies course. I recently realized that I had
underestimated the potential of the case. This Conference, and some
conversations with my colleague Bill Whitford led me to realize that
Hadley can be used more ambitiously. The trick to doing this is easy.
One has simply to ask students to imagine that the notice of special
circumstances had been given, and then ask what the victims of the
breach would have needed to prove in order to recover significant
damages, and whether Baxendale would have had any remaining
credible defenses.

The first, and most interesting, of these issues requires a preliminary
foray into the facts of the case. The summary in the report of Hadley
v. Baxendale tells us little about the mill or Gloucester. 2 It says only
that "it appeared that the plaintiffs carried on an extensive business as
millers at Gloucester .... I One suspects that many-and perhaps
most-know little about Gloucester, less about milling, and are inclined to picture, in their minds' eye, a quaint rural mill with a watert Kathleen M. & George I. Haight Professor of Law and Associate Dean for
Academic Affairs, University of Wisconsin Law School, Madison, Wisconsin.
1. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
2. Id. at 146-50.
3. Id. at 147.
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wheel at its side, giving little weight to the adjective "extensive" in the
summary of the evidence. 4 This Author and Professor Whitford (and
one suspects many others), with nothing but an image of rural England in our minds, have presumed that the mill probably processed
grain brought to it by farmers in the region. We presumed, again
without evidence, that the mill made its money by providing the milling service, and that it probably did not own the grain that it milled.
Perhaps this picture was built by some splinters of information about
mills picked up in high school or college, or from visits to New England mill-sites on family vacations. If our picture had been a correct
one, then the mill might lose profits, when it was shut down, as the
result of customers taking their grain to a competing mill for milling.
Or, even if the mill bought the grain, and so made its profits partly by
adding value to grain by milling it and partly by taking the entrepreneurial risk of market price fluctuations in the flour trade, it
would have lost its profits when area farmers took their grain elsewhere for sale.
But . . . our bucolic image must give way to the facts. In 1854

Gloucester was not a sleepy English village, but an ancient and important city-a major inland port.5 The mill, doing business as the City
Flour Mills, was a substantial commercial enterprise.6 It imported
grain from abroad, apparently for its own account (though it may also
have bought or processed grain from area farmers-we do not
know). 7 Just as Richard Danzig taught us that we should understand
the case as a case-study in "the Industrialization of the Law,"8 so we
should appreciate that the City Flour Mills itself was apparently a part
of the Industrial Revolution.
The Hadleys9 initially alleged losses of £300 arising from a five-day
delay in delivery of the mill shaft.10 It is easy to overlook that this was
a serious amount of money, and suggests the size of the enterprise.
One estimate is that £300 in 1854 would be the equivalent of more
4. Id.
5. Hugh Conway Jones, The Historical Setting for Hadley v. Baxendale, 11 TEX.
WESLEYAN

L.

REV.

243 (2005).

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrializationof the
Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (1975). Danzig's article remains the classic study of the
case and should be read by everyone who teaches it.
9. Joseph and Jonah Hadley were the proprietors of the mill. Id. at 251. The
caption of the case is "Hadley and Another v. Baxendale and Others." It is fair to
assume that, together, Joseph and Jonah Hadley are "Hadley and Another." Subsequent references to the plaintiff will be to "the Hadleys."
10. Danzig, supra note 8, at 251. Danzig elaborates by indicating that Baxendale
offered to settle for £25, which they deposited in court. Id. The plaintiffs declined to
settle for that amount, and the jury ultimately returned a verdict for the plaintiffs in
the amount of £50, which was £25 in addition to that which had already been deposited with the court. Id. at 251-52.
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than £14,000 today." If a business could make profits of nearly £3,000
a day, this suggests annual profits, in today's terms, in the neighborhood of £750,000 or $1,400,000.12
So . . . we have a five-day interruption in the business of a quite
substantial commercial enterprise. The plaintiffs' claim foundered on
the rocks of forseeability. 3 But for purposes of getting the most
teaching mileage from the case, it may be worth assuming, for argument purposes, that the notice of special circumstances had been
given. What issues would have remained? If you had been the lawyer
for the defendant, Baxendale, what arguments would you have raised
to defeat, or cast doubt on, plaintiffs' claim? The balance of this brief
Essay is intended to explore those issues in an order, the extent to
which they appeared provocative, rather than by an order dictated by
logical necessity.
A NERI CASE?
In most contracts and remedies courses,
of poor Mr. Neri (or poor Retail Marine,
thies). 4 We learn from this case that if
law's remedial admonition to seek to put

students learn of the plight
depending on your sympawe take seriously contract
the injured plaintiff in the

11. Lawrence H. Officer, Comparing the Purchasing Power of Money in Great
Britain from 1264 to 2002, Economic History Services, at http://www.eh.net/hmit/
ppowerbp/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2005) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
12. Id. This assumes 260 business days a year. The assumptions underlying these
calculations, of course, approach the heroic. The arithmetic is simple, but one must
be cautious about accepting the underlying assumptions. I accepted, on faith, the
work of Mr. Officer without verification. Some numbers were rounded and 260 working days per year was assumed. An exchange rate of $1.80 equals £1. Remember, we
are not making a bank loan here, but only verifying that the enterprise was a substantial one. Even if some of the assumptions are not quite right, the conclusion that this
was a relatively large business seems a conservative one. Richard Danzig underscores
the same point in footnote 8 of his article, providing more information about the
buying power of British Pounds in the 1850s. Danzig, supra note 7, at 251-52 n.8. Not
as important, but interesting nevertheless, the report of the case notes that the charge
for transporting the shaft was £2, 4 shillings; relying again on Officer, this would represent approximately £110 or $200 today. See Officer, supra note 11.
13. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
14. Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311 (N.Y. 1972). Though the case is
widely taught, it might not be universally taught. The case concerns a purchaser (Neri)
who breaks a contract to buy a boat. Id. at 396. The retailer (Retail Marine) sells the
particular boat (which was to have been delivered to Neri) to another buyer, and sues
Neri for breach. Id. Neri, by way of defense, sought to reduce any damages owed
Retail Marine by urging that he was entitled to take into account the sale to the other
buyer. Id. That is, the case concerns the measure of damages to which a retailer is
entitled, and whether that customer is entitled to "due credit" for any subsequent
resale. Id. The court ruled against Neri and interpreted U.C.C. 2-708(2) to mean that
a retailer may be entitled to the profit it lost when a customer defaults even when the
goods are sold to another buyer. Id. at 400. After all, the retailer may have made two
sales and earned two profits. Since the remedial goal is to put any retailer in the place
that performance would have, the second sale does not reduce the seller's damages.
Thus, the lost profit of the lost-volume seller is preserved.
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position performance would have done, sometimes businesses lose
profits when their customers breach contracts, and sometimes not.
The Neri case illustrates that sometimes retailers who lose sales of
fixed price goods are entitled to recover the profits they would have
made if the defaulting party had completed the transaction, and sometimes not. The outcome depends on whether the seller is a lost-volume seller. If the retailer would have been able to make two sales
(and hence two profits) had the customer not reneged, then the customer should be responsible to pay the retailer an amount equal to
the profit that was lost due to the breach, as well as any other incidental damages. Courts generally give the retailers the benefit of the
doubt on this question-they are presumed to be lost-volume sellers.
But what does this have to do with Hadley's mill?
The same issue can arise in breach of contract cases that do not
involve lost retail sales. A case which raises this issue in another context is the 1921 case of Mount PleasantStable Co. v. Steinberg.15 In
that case, a stable recovered damages arising from the breach of a
contract to rent teams of horses.16 The court, rejecting defendant's
argument that the stable could have mitigated damages by renting the
horses to others, held that the plaintiff could presumably have supplied different horses to the hypothetical second customer and made
two profitable contracts rather than just one.17 This is consistent with
the presumption that service-suppliers can readily expand to serve
more customers. So lost-volume service providers can sometimes receive treatment analogous to lost-volume retailers of standard-priced
goods.
To move this one-step closer to Hadley v. Baxendale, let us hypothesize two mills. Mill #1 is the mill that many of us have always
imagined-a mill that made a profit by providing the service of milling
grain for area farmers. During the five days that the mill was shut
down waiting for the mill shaft to arrive, Mill #1 had to turn away a
certain number of farmers who arrived with grain. Those farmers
took their grain elsewhere to have it milled. The profits that Mill #1
would have made on the five extra days it was shut down are lost
forever, unless they can be recovered from the contract breacher. Of
course, the plaintiff would face other obstacles such as the need to
prove the breach in fact caused the loss, the need to prove losses with
the requisite degree of confidence, and so forth. If those obstacles can
be overcome, then it seems a straightforward case for recovery of the
proven losses.
Now imagine Mill #2. Mill #2 is probably more like the actual mill
in Hadley v. Baxendale. Mill #2 buys grain in both nearby and distant
markets, mills it into flour, and sells the flour. It profits by adding
15. 131 N.E. 295 (Mass. 1921).
16. Id. at 295.
17. Id. at 296.
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value to the flour, as well as (perhaps) by making wise purchases and
sales in the grain and flour market. What damages does Mill #2 incur
if it is shut down for five days? Does it not depend on whether the
mill was operating at full capacity? If it was functioning at full capacity, then it loses five days worth of the use of its capital and labor,
which it can never recover except from the defendant. But if it was
functioning at less than full capacity, then it has fewer losses, and perhaps not worth troubling about. If it was functioning at eighty-five
percent capacity, then it would take some time for it to get back on
schedule, but the profit earned by milling the grain would merely be
delayed and not lost. It is here that the spectre of Mr. Neri appears.' 8
Just as Retail Marine's profits were held to depend on whether it
would have sold one or two boats, 19 the lost profits of a mill whose
operations are interrupted would seem to depend on whether it lost
profitable opportunities permanently, or if those opportunities were
not lost, but just delayed.
So the Hadleys might have expected an argument from the Baxendales about the extent and nature of their losses while the mill was
shut down. Were the revenues that the plaintiffs were claiming lost
forever, or was their receipt merely delayed? As we think about those
losses, we might address additional troublesome questions: how can
one practically prove commercial losses with requisite certainty?
What about the recovery of overhead? What about the losses that
might have been avoided?
REASONABLE CERTAINTY

It is worth pausing to remind ourselves how difficult it is to establish
losses when those losses involve a complex enterprise. Time does not
permit lingering long on this topic, but the cases in which a plaintiff
suffered from an inability to cost-effectively prove losses fill the reports. The burden of proving losses is, of course, on the plaintiff. One
suspects that defendants have effectively utilized the legal analogue to
18. The more one teaches contracts and remedies, the more often the Neri issue
seems to appear. Another famous contract case, Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919
(Mich. 1887), inspired Professor Brainerd Currie to write an epic poem about Rose of
Aberlone, the barren cow that wasn't. Currie's poem closes with the lines:
In many a hypothetical
With characters alphabetical,
In many a subtle and sly disguise
There lurks the ghost of her sad brown eyes.
That she will turn up in some set of facts is
Almost as certain as death and taxes ...
Brainerd Currie, poem, available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/rubinfeldd/
LS145/roseofaberlone.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2005) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan
Law Review). The same might be said about Mr. Neri. Had we but world enough,
and time .... a poetic tribute to Mr. Neri would make a nice project. (My apologies to
Andrew Marvel.)
19. Neri, 285 N.E.2d at 312.
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the "rope-a-dope" boxing technique.2 0 A defendant can often gain a
bargaining advantage simply by challenging the plaintiff to "prove it."
Though discovery techniques may assist a plaintiff in this process (and
may prove to be a kind of counter-weapon, since discovery requests
by plaintiff can impose substantial costs on defendants), it would have
been no simple matter for a large industrial enterprise to prove just
how much damage would have resulted by the business interruption.
How much grain would have been milled? What were the costs of that
grain? What were the costs of milling?
The examples of such cases are legion-one should suffice. In Holt
1 the defendant failed to make
Atherton Industries, Inc. v. Heine,"
timely repairs on a bulldozer owned by the plaintiffs. The defendant
failed to respond to the complaint, and a default judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs.2 2 In such a case, Texas law requires a
hearing and the introduction of sufficient evidence to substantiate
plaintiff's claim for damages.2 3 The trial court had entered a judgment
in favor of plaintiffs for $159,665, including $120,000 in lost profits.2 4
Despite this, the Supreme Court of Texas ruled that the evidence as to
lost profits failed to meet the minimum standard, which required that
plaintiffs establish lost profits "by competent evidence with reasonable certainty" and so remanded the case for further proceedings as to
the amount of damages due plaintiffs.25 The dissent accused the majority of "insensitivity to the realities of independent business" and
argued that the proof offered satisfied the Texas requirement.2 6 The
case is interesting partly because the majority and dissent took such
different views of the same record, and partly because, in a 1996 law
review article,27 Marshall and Beron cite Holt Atherton as a case in
which the use of the statistical technique of a multivariate regression
analysis might have allowed the plaintiffs to satisfy the reviewing
court.28 The Marshall and Beron argument is an interesting one, but
one wonders whether the stakes in most business-loss cases would be
high enough to justify resorting to the regression analysis method they
recommend. Clearly, expert testimony would be required, and expert
testimony in such cases, designed to satisfy the reasonable-certainty
standard, creates its own difficulties.
20. For those unfamiliar with this strategy, in his 1974 championship fight against
George Foreman, Muhammed Ali leaned against the ropes and allowed Foreman to
tire himself out, by punching at Ali, using lots of energy, but without much damage to
Ali.
21. 835 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1992).
22. Id. at 82.
23. See id. at 83.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 84.
26. Id. at 86 n.1 (Doggett, J., concurring and dissenting).
27. Kevin S. Marshall & Kurt J. Beron, Statistics and the Law: Proving Lost Profits, 2 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 467, 496 (1996).
28. Id. at 477-78.
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One extreme case that demonstrates this difficulty is Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.2 9 Douglas was late delivering
ninety passenger jets to Eastern Airlines, and Eastern sued to recover
its losses.3 0 Eastern's expert testified that the delay caused the airline
to lose $23,400,000 in profits. 3 ' McDonnell's expert, on the other
hand, testified that the delay actually saved Eastern
$1,294,000 be32
cause the tardy delivery reduced financing costs!
OVERHEAD

Although businesses hope to make profits, in the short run what
they gain or lose are revenues. Whether they lose profits is something
they often discover only after the accountant has done the books.
While we often speak of businesses losing profits as the result of a
breach and of claims for lost profits, this can be slightly misleading.
When an unprofitable business loses the benefit of a transaction that
would have helped defray fixed expenses, it has suffered a loss. The
victim of a breach should be able to recover the expenses that it reasonably incurred in connection with the transaction and any net profits it lost by virtue of the breach. The plaintiff needs to establish the
costs and the profits with the appropriate degree of reliability, which
can be difficult. It is relatively uncontroversial that a breach victim
should be able to recover the direct costs that it can prove it has incurred. Recovery of the indirect expenses, or overhead, has proven
more controversial and confusing.
Overhead is something of a mystery to many. U.C.C. section 2708(2) reminds us that in the appropriate cases involving goods, "the
measure of damages is the profit (including reasonable overhead)
which the seller would have made from full performance .. .. '3 The
issue is essentially the same whether or not the case is a sale of goods
case. For example, in the classic case itself, the issues could easily
have arisen if a seller of custom-made mill shafts had been five days
late in delivering a mill shaft ordered by the Hadleys. Without the
need for citation, there are many arguments, in the cases, as to the
extent of overhead expenses that can fairly be attributed to any particular transaction.
When retailers sell goods, or service providers provide services,
they receive revenue, which for purposes computing damages can be
usefully seen as consisting of three parts. The first portion of the revenue can be allocated to cover the direct costs associated with the sale.
These direct costs would include the wholesale cost of the product and
any commission paid to a sales agent, or in the case of services, the
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 962.
Id. at 965.
Id. at 999.
U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (2000).
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wages paid to the workers who labored to provide the service. The
second portion of the revenue must be allocated to cover the indirect
costs of selling the product, or service. These indirect costs, such as
rent, utilities, interest on loans, and so forth, are often called overhead.
Overhead expenses are those expenses associated with running a business and not clearly connected to any particular transaction. But if a
business is to at least break even, it needs to cover these indirect costs
from the revenues for selling its goods or services. Finally, any
amount left after recovering all costs, both direct and indirect, represents the net profit on the transaction.
Quite unfortunately, many business people refer to the difference
between revenue from the sale and direct costs as "profit." It is unfortunate because the use of the unmodified word "profit" creates the
risk of confusing net and gross profit. Gross profit is the difference
between revenue and direct costs or, to look at it another way, gross
profit is the sum of net profit plus overhead. To say it still again, in yet
another form, the difference between net and gross profit is overhead.
When the Hadleys sought to prove their losses, what kinds of losses
might they have claimed? One would imagine that a significant part
of the claim might be for losses that could be categorized as overhead.
The Hadleys may have incurred the expenses of owning and operating
the plant with no corresponding opportunity to benefit from the use of
those assets. An example of a case in which the court confronted the
recovery of overhead might be instructive.
Vitex Manufacturing Corp. v. Caribtex Corp.3 4 involved a seller that
had closed its plant.3 Seller then negotiated a contract with Buyer to
process woolen material.36 Seller reopened its plant, ordered the necessary chemicals, and recalled its work force.37 Buyer then
breached.3" The trial court found that seller's gross revenues would
have been $31,250, its direct costs associated with the processing
$10,136, and so its damages were $21,114.1' Buyer argued that the
trial court had erred by not subtracting seller's overhead expenses
from the contract price in determining lost profits.4 0 The Third Circuit
upheld the trial court's decision to allow recovery of overhead:
Although there is authority to the contrary, we feel that the better
view is that normally, in a claim for lost profits, overhead should be
treated as a part of gross profits and recoverable as damages, and
should not be considered as a part of the seller's costs. A number of
cases hold that since overhead expenses are not affected by the per34. 377 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1967).
35. Id. at 797.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. Because it avoided incurring the direct costs when buyer breached, those
costs were avoided, and therefore unrecoverable.
40. Id. at 798.
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formance of the particular contract, there should be no need to deduct them in computing lost profits....
Buyer] may argue that this view ignores modern accounting principles, and that overhead is as much a cost of production as other
expenses. It is true that successful businessmen must set their prices
at sufficient levels to recoup all their expenses, including overhead,
and to gain profits. Thus, the price the businessman should charge
on each transaction could be thought of as that price necessary to
yield a pro rata portion of the company's fixed overhead, the direct
costs associated with production, and a "clear" profit. Doubtless
this type of calculation is used by businessmen and their accountants . .

.

. However, because it is useful for planning purposes to

allocate a portion of overhead to each transaction, it does not follow
that this allocated share of fixed overhead should be considered a
cost factor in the computation of lost profits on individual transactions ..... 4

One might argue that the court itself is a bit confused here, as if it
were accepting the buyer's argument that if something can be categorized as a cost, then that cost is credited to the breacher.4 2 It is struggling with a formula that it understands requires subtracting "costs"
from the revenues lost to the breach's victim. 43 The defendant is trying to take advantage of this by pointing out that overhead expenses
are "costs" and should therefore be deducted.4 4 Confusion arises because this formulation fails to directly acknowledge that the costs to
be deducted are costs that either were not incurred, or could reasonably have been avoided.4 5 There is no need to denythat overhead expenses are costs in order to justify their recovery.
By the very nature of this allocation process, as the number of
transactions over which overhead can be spread becomes smaller,
each transaction must bear a greater portion or allocated share of the
fixed overhead cost. Suppose a company has fixed overhead of
$10,000 and engages in five similar transactions; then the receipts of
each transaction would bear $2,000 of overhead expense. If the company is now forced to spread this $10,000 over only four transactions,
then the overhead expense per transaction will rise to $2,500, significantly reducing the profitability of the four remaining transactions.
Thus, where the contract is between businessmen familiar with commercial practices, as here, the breaching party should reasonably foresee that his breach will not only cause a loss of "clear" profit, but also
a loss in that the profitability of other transactions will be reduced ....
Therefore, this loss is within the contemplation of "losses caused and
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 798-99 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
See id.
Id. at 797 n.1.
Id. at 798.
Id.
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gains prevented," and overhead should be considered to be a compensable item of damage.
MITIGATION

One suspects that, in the case of Hadley's mill, many of the mill's
expenses may have been overhead expenses. The mill suffered a loss
when it lost a revenue-producing transaction. If the mill needed to be
heated while it was shut down, then this expense should be recoverable because it is an expense that can never generate any benefit for
the mill owners. If the Hadleys were obligated to pay workers while
the mill was shut down, and those workers had no other beneficial
work to do, then that is an expense the Hadleys would undoubtedly
claim and should be recoverable.
But this last example provides an opportunity to introduce, or review, another remedial principle. The previous paragraph hypothesized an obligatory payment to the workers. But a claimant can only
recover losses it could not have reasonably avoided. In this case, may
the defendant not plausibly contend that some of the mill's expenses
could have been avoided during the shut-down? If workers were paid
while the mill was idle, for example, is the mill owner entitled to recover those amounts? Were the workers idle, or were they assigned to
do other valuable work such as deferred maintenance? If they were
idle, should they have been sent home? One suspects that most workmen in the middle of the nineteenth century were paid only when they
worked and had no right to be paid when their employer was not using their labor. This suggests that worker's wages might not be
recoverable.
Suppose the employer chose to pay them, although it was not obligated to do so? Mitigation of damages rules generally apply a principle of reasonableness. If an employer might reasonably conclude that
in order to preserve employee good will, maintain morale, and minimize the risks that valuable employees might seek other employment,
a decision to pay them while idle would be reasonable and such payments should be recoverable.
CONCLUSION

This brief Essay is not intended to be an authoritative account of all
of the lessons of Hadley v. Baxendale. Its modest goal is simply to
suggest that it is easy to extend the lessons that can be drawn from the
case, either to introduce issues anew, or to review them. I will stop
here, lest I run afoul of Benjamin Franklin's warning: "The most exquisite Folly is made of Wisdom spun too fine." 46
46. POOR RICHARD'S
Walley ed., 1746).

ALMANACK, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN'S BEST SAYINGS
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